Rakuten Mobile reported its third-quarter results on 13 November, and Iain Morris's account in Light Reading the same day is mostly about sites. When Rakuten started out, its executives expected to need 40,000 to 50,000 sites to cover Japan, with simplified radio designs adding 30% to 40% of coverage compared with traditional equipment. It operates 106,000 today, and since KDDI decided in August to end its roaming agreement, Rakuten is building more.
The capex follows. Rakuten's telco business invested about JPY63 billion in 2025 and needs about JPY200 billion this year, of which JPY105.7 billion had been spent by the end of September. The remaining JPY94.3 billion is about 3.3 times what it spent in the final quarter of 2025. Customer additions fell to 297,000 in the quarter from 405,000 a year earlier, which Rakuten blames on concerns about roaming reduction, leaving it with about 11 million customers and a 5% share of the market. Revenue grew 17.1% to JPY111.4 billion and the operating loss narrowed to JPY30.3 billion from JPY37.3 billion, but Light Reading puts the group's cumulative net losses since 2019 at about $7.9 billion.
Rakuten still points to its open RAN. It uses its RAN Intelligent Controller to host software that adjusts antenna tilt without manual intervention, to improve coverage and capacity. Morris notes that the same feature is available from traditional vendors to Japan's other operators, and concludes that virtualization and open RAN have been massively oversold.
I would put it differently. Rakuten proved that a cloud native mobile network, with virtualized RAN, cloud native core, automated operations, etc... can be built and run at national scale, which is what I wrote in 2020, and that part has held. What it did not prove, and was never going to prove, is that software substitutes for spectrum. Rakuten holds 186MHz, about 100MHz of it at 3.5GHz (a poor band for wide area and in-building coverage), against more than 250MHz for SoftBank. No controller recovers the propagation of low-band frequencies an operator does not own.
Automated antenna tilt is not new either. It is a centralized SON function, the ancestor of today's rApps, as mentioned at FYUZ 2 weeks ago. It makes existing sites work better. It does not make a cell reach further than its band allows, and it does not replace a roaming partner who walks away.
In my mind, the 106,000 figure says nothing about whether open RAN works technically. It says the original coverage model rested on an optimistic link budget and on a roaming agreement that would last, and both assumptions were commercial, not architectural. The site count is the cost of spectrum scarcity, and it shows up in the capex line rather than in the architecture diagram. RIC automation delivers real, measurable gains, but they are measured as a percentage of an existing network's performance, not in sites avoided, and the 30% to 40% coverage gain promised 6 years ago was never within a controller's reach.
It will be interesting to see whether Rakuten's next results report the RIC by the coverage it adds, or only by the manual interventions it saves.

