Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Vodafone is putting RAN GPUs to the grill


On 17 November, Iain Morris reported in Light Reading that Vodafone has not yet approved GPUs for its radio access network. Kyriakos Exadaktylos, the group's head of RAN evolution, told an Omdia AI-RAN symposium that Vodafone is building labs with advanced capabilities at its Malaga innovation campus to measure the benefit on network efficiency first, and that "we have not, at the moment, stamped that we have a green light" for GPU deployments. He is, at the same time, convinced that AI will improve the RAN significantly.

This is the third data point in a few weeks pointing the same way. In London, Virgin Media O2 (a Telefonica and Liberty Global joint venture, not a Vodafone company, for those keeping score) ran the AI-RAN trial I covered here and here, which delivered a 20% spectral efficiency gain on Nokia's Marvell based custom silicon, the same figure Nokia had talked about achieving this year on Nvidia GPUs. Vodafone's position, as reported, is that existing algorithms with AI embedded will not require new silicon, and that more advanced models are 2 to 3 years away and still need to be validated.

The technical argument is simple enough. Link adaptation, the function that picks modulation and coding for each user, has to decide in about 40 microseconds according to Gabriel Foglander, Ericsson's head of RAN strategy, and Ericsson already runs a neural network for it on its own ASICs. Models that must answer that fast are small and need deterministic timing, which is what purpose-built silicon does well. CPUs, Arm, GPUs, ASICs, etc... the RAN has seen every hardware pitch in the last decade, and the small model problem favours the incumbent chip.

The economic argument runs the other way, and Ericsson's own executive made it. RAN silicon only sells into the RAN market, which Omdia sized at about $35 billion last year (a small market by the standards of the chip vendors now courting it). If AI software evolves faster than ASIC generations, operators will have to replace baseband more often, and Foglander pointed out that installation, commissioning and truck rolls are a substantial part of that capex. A GPU, oversized for today's models, would last longer in the field.

In my mind, this moves the debate away from the chip. The ASIC wins today on a 40 microsecond task, so the real question is how often an operator will accept a baseband refresh to keep pace with AI models, and at what cost per site. Neither Ericsson nor Nokia has published that cadence or that cost for either path. The 20% figure, measured against an unstated baseline, does not prove one silicon beats the other: it shows the gain came from the software, which is precisely the case for keeping the installed hardware. I think the burden of proof sits with the GPU camp, and a lab like Malaga is where it will be met or not, as mentioned before.

Nokia has the most exposure. It has committed its future RAN products to Nvidia GPUs after Nvidia's $1 billion investment, while its 7,000 site VodafoneThree contract in the UK had only 10 sites activated by April, according to Light Reading. What Vodafone learns in Malaga will decide whether that network is built on Marvell silicon, on GPUs, or on a mix of both.

It will be interesting to see whether Vodafone publishes its Malaga results, baseline included, before VodafoneThree has to make that choice.

Monday, November 16, 2026

Rakuten Mobile's RIC tilts antennas, not economics


Rakuten Mobile reported its third-quarter results on 13 November, and Iain Morris's account in Light Reading the same day is mostly about sites. When Rakuten started out, its executives expected to need 40,000 to 50,000 sites to cover Japan, with simplified radio designs adding 30% to 40% of coverage compared with traditional equipment. It operates 106,000 today, and since KDDI decided in August to end its roaming agreement, Rakuten is building more.

The capex follows. Rakuten's telco business invested about JPY63 billion in 2025 and needs about JPY200 billion this year, of which JPY105.7 billion had been spent by the end of September. The remaining JPY94.3 billion is about 3.3 times what it spent in the final quarter of 2025. Customer additions fell to 297,000 in the quarter from 405,000 a year earlier, which Rakuten blames on concerns about roaming reduction, leaving it with about 11 million customers and a 5% share of the market. Revenue grew 17.1% to JPY111.4 billion and the operating loss narrowed to JPY30.3 billion from JPY37.3 billion, but Light Reading puts the group's cumulative net losses since 2019 at about $7.9 billion.

Rakuten still points to its open RAN. It uses its RAN Intelligent Controller to host software that adjusts antenna tilt without manual intervention, to improve coverage and capacity. Morris notes that the same feature is available from traditional vendors to Japan's other operators, and concludes that virtualization and open RAN have been massively oversold.

I would put it differently. Rakuten proved that a cloud native mobile network, with virtualized RAN, cloud native core, automated operations, etc... can be built and run at national scale, which is what I wrote in 2020, and that part has held. What it did not prove, and was never going to prove, is that software substitutes for spectrum. Rakuten holds 186MHz, about 100MHz of it at 3.5GHz (a poor band for wide area and in-building coverage), against more than 250MHz for SoftBank. No controller recovers the propagation of low-band frequencies an operator does not own.

Automated antenna tilt is not new either. It is a centralized SON function, the ancestor of today's rApps, as mentioned at FYUZ 2 weeks ago. It makes existing sites work better. It does not make a cell reach further than its band allows, and it does not replace a roaming partner who walks away.

In my mind, the 106,000 figure says nothing about whether open RAN works technically. It says the original coverage model rested on an optimistic link budget and on a roaming agreement that would last, and both assumptions were commercial, not architectural. The site count is the cost of spectrum scarcity, and it shows up in the capex line rather than in the architecture diagram. RIC automation delivers real, measurable gains, but they are measured as a percentage of an existing network's performance, not in sites avoided, and the 30% to 40% coverage gain promised 6 years ago was never within a controller's reach.

It will be interesting to see whether Rakuten's next results report the RIC by the coverage it adds, or only by the manual interventions it saves.