Showing posts with label Monetization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Monetization. Show all posts

Friday, September 11, 2026

Bell Canada Launches Self-Serve Network as a Service


Bell Canada announced on 10 September the Bell On-Demand Network, which it describes as the country's first network-as-a-service platform aligned with the 7 customer experience attributes defined by Mplify, the industry body formerly known as MEF: on-demand, observable, manageable, programmable, secure, modular and flexible. TelecomTV carried the announcement in its 10 September roundup. The platform runs on Bell's fibre network with Cisco 8000 Series Secure Routers underneath, and the operator's description is that business customers can, through a single self-serve platform, "autonomously order, activate, manage and scale connectivity". The first product is On-Demand Internet, available in Ontario and Québec wherever Bell has deployed fibre, with additional networking, security, cloud connectivity and automation capabilities to follow. Bell's CTO Mark McDonald said customers "can now provision, scale and adjust their network in real time, getting the exact bandwidth and services they need, the moment they need them". No price, no provisioning time, no API documentation and no customer figure were published.

The customer configures, the operator does not pre-package

I have argued for some time that the natural end state of differentiated connectivity is slicing as a service: a platform through which third parties discover, configure, reserve and consume network resources on demand, because enterprise CIOs know their connectivity needs better than the operator does and are used to configuring cloud services rather than selecting from a catalogue. Bell's launch is that model applied to fixed access, and it is worth noting what is different from the 3 mobile launches of the past 3 weeks. EE sells a priority lane as a tariff, Vodafone sells a predefined quality profile through an API, and Telstra sells a slice for 1 application chosen by the operator. In each of those the operator decides what the product is and the customer decides whether to buy it. In Bell's description the customer decides the bandwidth and the timing, and the operator's role is to make the change when asked. That is the inversion the slicing-as-a-service argument depends on, and Bell states it as the product rather than as a roadmap.

Fixed first, because bandwidth on fibre is a reservation

It is not an accident that the self-serve model arrives on fibre before it arrives on mobile. When Vodafone launched quality on demand I wrote that a priority is not a reservation: a mobile profile improves the customer's place in the queue on a congested cell but does not guarantee what comes out of it, and the profile parameters were not published. On a dedicated fibre access line a bandwidth change is a reservation. The capacity exists, the router policy is deterministic, and the operator can honour the customer's chosen figure without a proof-of-value engine to check whether it did. That is why Bell can let the customer set the number and why the mobile operators cannot yet. It is also why the interesting part of Bell's roadmap is the part that is not launched: cloud connectivity and security are where the customer's requirement starts to depend on a second network and a second party, and the on-demand model will be tested at the first boundary it has to cross. Mplify's 7 attributes describe the customer's experience inside 1 provider's platform. They do not describe what happens when the customer's agent asks 2 providers for the same thing.

Programmable is the attribute that matters

Of the 7 attributes, 6 describe a good portal. The seventh, programmable, is the one that decides whether this is a self-serve web page or a network resource that a customer's own systems can consume. Bell's announcement describes a platform, not an API, and does not say whether the ordering, scaling and observability functions are exposed to the customer's software or only to a person logged into a portal. The distinction is the one I drew at DTW Ignite: the APIs that ship are the ones that ask the network a question, and the ones that ask it to change its behaviour on a third party's instruction are harder. On-Demand Internet is the second kind, in the easiest domain. If it is programmable in the Mplify sense, a customer's cloud automation or an enterprise agent can scale the access line up before a backup window and down after it without a human on either side, and Bell has built a resource the customer's software can reason about. If it is a portal, Bell has built a better ordering experience. The announcement does not say which, and it is the first thing a CIO evaluating it should ask.

What has not been published

No price relative to a standard business fibre contract, no provisioning time for a bandwidth change, no statement of whether the platform is API-accessible or portal-only, no minimum term or change frequency, no customer count and no date for the cloud connectivity and security capabilities. 4 things to watch. First, published API documentation, which is the test of the programmable attribute. Second, the price of a bandwidth change against the price of a permanent upgrade, because the on-demand model only pays for the customer if variable capacity is priced below fixed capacity over the period it is used. Third, whether Bell extends the same self-serve model to its mobile network, where it would need 5G standalone slicing and a service level of the kind Telstra attached to its slice. Fourth, whether the cloud connectivity capability, when it arrives, lets the customer configure the far end as well as the access line, which is the first crossing of an administrative boundary and the point at which slicing as a service stops being a single-operator product.

Agentic AI Could Raise Telco Opex by 30%


Two reports published on 10 September describe the same balance sheet from opposite ends. Bain & Company, as reported by Telecoms.com's Mary Lennighan, warns that operators could see operating costs rise by around 30% without any gain in productivity or growth if agentic AI is bolted onto legacy operating models. The consultancy describes an emerging agentic operating model in which traditional costs account for 70% to 80% of an operator's total and AI costs for 20% to 30%, with the risk that the legacy 70% to 80% never goes away. The same morning, TelecomTV's James Pearce published a second cut of the AI-Native Telco Index, the 276-page evaluation of 56 operators based on published material from January to June 2026, and found that 20 of the 56 frame their AI strategy primarily around revenue, 28 balance revenue and efficiency, and only 6 are primarily focused on efficiency. TelecomTV names the 6 as KPN, Proximus, Spark New Zealand, BT Group, Comcast and Rogers. It also notes, in the same article, that across all 56 operators cost savings remain the most clearly measured AI-related financial impact.

A new cost layer on top of the old one

Bain's argument is about arithmetic rather than technology. Model prices have fallen almost 10 times in the past year, according to the report, but token usage is rising faster as staff find new uses in network operations and customer care. At roughly half the token price, a 4.5 times increase in usage doubles the bill. The recommendation is to measure the cost of a business outcome, a resolved customer issue or a closed network incident, rather than the cost per token, and to hold someone accountable for model drift and token spend. AT&T is the worked example: it redesigned its orchestration so that large supervising agents delegate to smaller specialised models, which by AT&T's own account cut costs by up to 90% while tripling throughput. Bain's 3 cost traps are the token bill, the dual operating model in which human teams keep running the process while AI performs isolated tasks at the edges, and the low-risk demonstration that improves efficiency at the margin without touching the P&L. Internal chatbots, call summaries and copilots are named in the third category. This is the cost side of the 3 money flows I set out in July, when I argued that cost avoidance and revenue must be separated before an operator can say what AI is worth to it. Bain adds the point that cost avoidance is not automatic either: the avoided cost has to be removed from the organisation, and a process that is augmented rather than replaced removes nothing.

Revenue is the stated priority, savings are the measured one

The Index finding runs the other way. When I covered the first edition of the Index on 7 September the observation was that none of its 4 dimensions was financial. The second cut is TelecomTV's answer, and it is a useful one, because it reads the same public record for money rather than for capability. Of the 20 revenue-first operators, 11 are Tier 2 operators with annual revenues between $2 billion and $10 billion, 11 are in Asia and 4 in the Middle East, which TelecomTV reads as evidence that the shift toward AI revenue is not being led from Europe or North America. The examples with numbers attached are few. Bell Canada reported around C$700 million of AI-powered revenue in 2025, up 60%, and targets around C$2 billion a year by 2028. SK Telecom's AI datacentre business grew 92.5% year on year to 136.2 billion won in the second quarter, with AI B2B and B2C services at 61.3 billion won, up 24.5%. Indosat Ooredoo Hutchison reports sovereign AI cloud income separately, $28 million in 2025 with guidance of $60 million in 2026, and its Zankore joint venture with Nvidia, Nokia and Ooredoo raised $3.1 billion in debt this week to build 200 MW of GPU capacity by early 2027. On the efficiency side, KPN targets around €100 million a year in operating cost savings by 2030, Proximus folds AI into a €180 million efficiency programme, and Spark credits its churn model with reducing customer loss by up to 30%. TelecomTV also cites GSMA Intelligence's finding that only 35% of telco AI initiatives include a revenue objective. Read together, the picture is that revenue is what operators now say, savings are what they can measure, and 2 of the 3 operators publishing AI revenue lines, SK Telecom and Indosat, are selling compute or cloud capacity, which is the first of the 4 credible revenue lines in the July post and the one that looks least like a telecom service. Bell has not said what its C$700 million comprises.

The number the business case is missing

Put the 2 reports side by side and the missing figure is obvious. The Index counts operators that talk about revenue and reports the revenue lines that exist. Bain estimates the cost that agentic AI adds and warns that the legacy cost may stay. Neither report, and no operator in the Index, publishes both halves for the same company: AI-attributed revenue, AI-attributed savings actually removed from the cost base, and the AI compute and token cost that Bain says will make up 20% to 30% of the operating model. Bell's C$700 million is a revenue figure with no cost of sale attached to it in public. SK Telecom's AI datacentre revenue is real, but it is a hosting business whose margin is set by power and GPU depreciation, not by the network. KPN's €100 million is a 2030 target. Bain's own preferred use cases, autonomous network incident resolution and proactive churn prevention, are the workflows where the operator has to redesign the process end to end and retire what it replaces, and they are also the workflows where the data has to be fit for an agent to act on. Deutsche Telekom's Ahmed Hafez told the AI-Native Telco Forum on 8 September that DT's network data "is not ready" for machines and that data quality demands will start appearing in supplier RFQs, which is a cost that precedes any saving. Bain's framing is the right one for the report I am completing on autonomous networks: cost per resolved incident, before and after, with the platform, compute and data cost inside the denominator. That is the number that converts a proof into a P&L entry, and it is the number no one in the Index has yet published.

What has not been published

No operator has published AI revenue, AI savings and AI operating cost for the same period. Bell has not disclosed the composition of its C$700 million or the margin on it. AT&T's 90% cost reduction is its own account, relayed by Bain, with no base figure. The Bain report itself is available from Bain; the figures here are as reported by Telecoms.com. 4 things to watch. First, whether any of the 20 revenue-first operators reports AI compute or token spend alongside AI revenue in a quarterly filing, since that would be the first complete line item. Second, whether a legacy cost is visibly retired and attributed to agentic automation, in headcount, systems or supplier spend, rather than a saving being projected. Third, the on-demand recording of the AI-Native Telco Forum session on closing the attribution gap between deployment and financial outcomes, with Deutsche Telekom, Everpure and TM Forum, which TelecomTV says will be posted within days. Fourth, whether the 2027 edition of the Index adds a financial dimension and, if it does, whether it measures cost of outcome the way Bain proposes.

Monday, July 27, 2026

Verizon Earning: From Copper to Fibre to Edge

 

Verizon disclosed on its second quarter earnings call last week a dark fibre agreement with Google worth well in excess of a billion dollars, and chief executive Dan Schulman was explicit that it is the first of several, with further deals expected by year end worth multiple billions of dollars in revenue over the coming years. The headlines went to the number and to the counterparty. The more instructive detail came later in the same call, where Schulman described retrofitting thousands of central offices, the copper now being decommissioned, into edge data centres for low latency AI inferencing. One operator, one earnings call, two of the arguments I have been making all month, and they are not the same argument.

Let's start with the fibre. This is not cost avoidance dressed as growth, which is the trap I wrote about when Google Cloud called agentic AI a sixty billion dollar opportunity and every figure underneath the headline turned out to be a saved operating cost. It is also not the speculative new revenue that strategy decks reach for. It is my second money flow, AI creating fresh demand for what the operator already sells, landed on the income statement as contracted revenue. Schulman called it incremental, long duration, high quality, and drawn from some of the most demanding infrastructure customers in the world. He is right to be pleased. Route and real estate are exactly the assets an operator holds that a hyperscaler cannot conjure at will, and the AI build out is short of both.

Now look at what Verizon actually sold. Dark fibre is unlit glass. Google puts its own optics on each end, chooses its own wavelengths, runs its own capacity, and owns everything above the physical layer. Verizon is the landlord of the route and nothing more. On the capacity, platform, outcome ladder I set out two weeks ago, this is not even rung one, it is the ground the ladder stands on. That is not a criticism. A contracted, long duration, low churn landlord business against demand this strong is a genuinely good thing to own, and it is more defensible than most of what operators like to call platforms. The discipline is only this: name it correctly. The moment next year's deck describes a dark fibre lease as an AI platform business, the margin expectation that travels with the word platform will arrive, and a landlord business will not carry it.

The central office retrofit is the disclosure I want to emphasize. For two years I have argued that AI grid compute belongs first at the central office and the mobile switching office, not at the cell site, because power, cooling, fibre, real estate and security all favour the building the operator already runs. I made the fabric versus location case in early July and watched operators lean into central office siting a few days later. Verizon has now put capital behind it on an earnings call. The copper decommission is what makes it work: retiring the old plant frees the floor space and, more importantly, the power feed and the fibre entrance, which are the two constraints that actually bind at an inference site. I built what was probably the first fully programmable multi access edge platform at Telefonica in 2018, and the lesson from that programme was that the physics was never the obstacle. The obstacle was a paying tenant. Low latency inference is the tenant the central office was always waiting for.

The reason to read the two disclosures together is that they resolve a question people keep posing as a choice. Fabric or location, route or venue, is the AI grid a transport problem or a siting problem. Verizon's answer, in one call, is both, and the call even tells you which is which today. The fabric is the contracted revenue, available now, sold in its rawest form. The location is the capital project, the copper coming out and the racks going in, its revenue still ahead of it. An operator that understood only the first would sell glass to hyperscalers and miss the building. An operator that understood only the second would light up central offices with no anchor tenant, which is precisely the mistake the edge computing industry made for a decade. Verizon is doing both, and the sequencing is correct.

So I would put the deal through the same three questions I put to every operator AI business case. Which money flow is this. It is flow two, defended and grown connectivity revenue, honestly labelled, not flow three in disguise. What binding constraint does the buyer pay to remove. Google is paying for route diversity and a dedicated physical layer it controls end to end, away from shared congestion, which is a real constraint and an operator asset. And where does it sit on the ladder. Rung one for the fibre, with a credible path upward only if the central office retrofit becomes a platform the operator actually operates, rather than a colocation cage it merely rents to the same hyperscalers. The fibre deal is booked. The ladder question is still open, and it will be answered in the buildings, not on the routes.

I wrote a fortnight ago that the operators who will be interesting in 2030 are not the ones with the most GPUs but the ones who can still tell you which of the three flows each dollar came from. Verizon has just given the cleanest demonstration yet of the discipline: a fabric dollar and a location dollar, named separately, on the same call. The test now is whether it keeps them separate all the way up the ladder, or whether the word platform arrives before the platform does.

Wednesday, July 22, 2026

The Telco AI $60 Billion "Opportunity"

Google Cloud published a piece in RCR Wireless this morning arguing that agentic AI represents a sixty billion dollar opportunity for telecom operators. It is a well constructed argument, the engineering description is accurate, and the case studies are real. It is also, read carefully, an argument about cost avoidance wearing the vocabulary of growth. I want to be precise about this, because eight days ago I published a piece arguing that the industry's central discipline problem is its refusal to separate the two, and this article is the cleanest illustration of the problem I have seen since.

Start with the numbers. The sixty billion figure comes from Appledore Research, and Appledore is explicit about what it is measuring: operational cost savings by 2030. The McKinsey research cited alongside it reports a thirty to seventy percent reduction in troubleshooting tickets and a fifty five to ninety percent reduction in network operations centre costs. Deutsche Telekom's RAN Guardian identified 237,000 network events in early 2026 and compressed major incident handling from hours to about sixty seconds. Bell Canada's AI Ops platform achieved a twenty five percent reduction in customer reported issues and a faster mean time to repair. Vodafone's agents protect millions in annual operating expenditure. Every one of those is a genuine achievement. Not one of them is revenue. The article's own evidence base is, without exception, my first money flow: AI that reduces cost, which I described as real, happening, the largest near term financial impact of AI on operators, and emphatically not a new line of business.

The word doing the concealing is "opportunity". An opportunity, in the way a board hears it, is something you invest in to get money back that you were not getting before. A cost saving is something you invest in to stop spending money you were already spending. The two justify different capital, different organisational patience, and different governance. Operators that hear sixty billion and staff a growth programme will find, three years in, that they have built a very good efficiency programme and told their investors the wrong story about it. That is not a hypothetical failure mode. It is the failure mode the industry has run repeatedly, and the reason I keep insisting the flows be kept apart on the page before they are kept apart in the budget.

There is a second problem with the sixty billion, which is that it is sitting next to a Deloitte figure of a hundred and fifty billion in "total value" and the two are quietly being read as the same kind of number. They are not. One is a cost line, the other is a mixed construct that includes cost, defended revenue and speculative new revenue in a single total. Adding vendor and consultancy figures that measure different things is the same error I flag on RAN energy savings, where individually plausible percentages get stacked into a number no operator has ever achieved. Treat the sixty billion as the honest number, because at least you can tell what it counts.

Now to the architecture, which is where the article is most interesting and most incomplete. Google Cloud's prescription is a fabric of hyper specialised micro agents, billing agents, inventory agents, RAN guardians, communicating through standardised orchestration protocols, validated against a digital twin, bounded by what it calls a deterministic governance framework with explicit decision boundaries and clean handoff to human engineers. This is good engineering. It is also, for at least the sixth time in a month, a description of containment rather than coordination. Every agent in that picture belongs to the operator. Every protocol is internal. Every boundary is a boundary between the operator's machine and the operator's human. Nothing in the design describes what happens when an agent that the operator does not own, and cannot inspect, arrives with a request.

The digital twin makes the gap unusually visible. A twin is a high fidelity replica of your own network, and it is exactly the right tool for testing a configuration change before you ship it. It is useless for the case that actually matters commercially, because you cannot build a twin of the counterparty. When an enterprise's AI agent negotiates for a guaranteed slice, the operator's agent is not reasoning about a system it can simulate. It is reasoning about an intent it must infer, an authority it must verify, and a commitment it must be able to audit afterwards. That is not a simulation problem. It is a problem of shared topology, shared ontology, explicit authority boundaries and durable audit trails, which is the meta model of the agentic plane I have been arguing for since the spring, and which a runtime does not supply no matter how good the runtime is.

I should say plainly that a hyperscaler making this argument is not a criticism of the hyperscaler. Google Cloud is selling a stack that does what it says it does, and the operators quoted are getting real results from it. My argument is with how operators will read it. There is a version of the next two years in which the industry retools its operations beautifully, takes out a very large amount of cost, calls the result an AI business, and arrives in 2030 with the same revenue line and a smaller headcount. That would not be a failure of technology. It would be a failure to name what was bought.

So the test I would apply to this article, and to every agentic AI business case that lands on a telco investment committee this quarter, is the one I set out eight days ago. Which flow is this, cost, defence, or new revenue? If the supporting evidence is entirely tickets, incidents and NOC headcount, the answer is cost, and the paper should say so in its first sentence rather than its appendix. What binding constraint does an external buyer pay to remove? If nobody outside the company pays anything, there is no buyer, and the word opportunity is unearned. And where on the capacity, platform, outcome ladder does this sit? An operator that automates its own operations has not stepped onto the ladder at all, because the ladder is about what you sell, and nobody is buying your NOC.

Sixty billion dollars of avoided cost is worth having. It is worth a serious programme, serious money and serious executive attention. It is worth all of that as what it is. The operators that will be interesting in 2030 are not the ones that saved the most. They are the ones that could still tell you, at the end of it, which of the three flows each dollar came from.

Monday, July 13, 2026

AI monetization for operators: separating revenue from cost avoidance

Every operator earnings call now features AI prominently. Listen closely, however, and most of what is described as "AI monetization" is nothing of the sort. It is cost avoidance cosplaying a revenue costume.

This distinction matters because the two require different investment logic, different organizational capabilities, and different patience horizons. Operators that blur them will misallocate capital. Operators that separate them have a chance at building genuine new B2B revenue lines — narrower than the hype suggests, but investable.

Three money flows, not one

AI touches operator economics through three distinct channels, and the discipline starts with refusing to aggregate them.

1. AI that reduces cost. Autonomous network operations, agentic customer care, energy optimization, predictive maintenance. This is real, it is happening, and it is the largest near-term financial impact of AI on operators. It is also not revenue. A dollar of opex avoided is valuable, but it does not create a new line of business, and it does not justify the "operators as AI companies" narrative. It justifies a leaner operator.

2. AI that defends existing revenue. Enterprises deploying AI workloads have new connectivity requirements: deterministic performance, low latency to inference endpoints, secure private connectivity to GPU capacity, data-gravity-aware networking. Operators that serve these requirements protect and modestly grow their core B2B connectivity business. This is differentiated connectivity for the AI era — important, defensible, but fundamentally an evolution of what operators already sell.

3. AI that creates new revenue. This is the category everyone wants to talk about and the one that deserves the most scrutiny. It exists, but it is narrower than most strategy decks admit.

The four credible new revenue lines

Having spent the last two years working on AI infrastructure with operators and vendors on both sides of the Atlantic, I see four B2B revenue opportunities that survive contact with commercial reality. They are not equal — they differ in demand maturity, margin profile and time horizon, and they should be funded accordingly.

Sovereign AI capacity — GPU-as-a-service and AI factories — is the most immediate and the most misunderstood. Demand is real and policy-driven, concentrated in regulated sectors; the margin profile is low-to-mid, because the business is capex-heavy and carries utilization risk; and the revenue is available now. The demand side is genuine: governments, healthcare systems, defense, financial services and public administrations in Europe increasingly cannot — or will not — run inference on US hyperscaler infrastructure under foreign jurisdiction. Operators hold assets that map remarkably well to this demand: national data center footprints, energy contracts, security clearances, sovereign trust, and enterprise sales relationships.

Telefónica's recent national rollout of edge-based GPU-as-a-service in Spain is instructive. The underlying edge platform was architected years earlier — I led the team that built and productized it — and for years the business case was marginal on enterprise use cases alone. What changed was not the technology. It was the arrival of sovereign AI demand, which finally gave the infrastructure a paying anchor tenant profile. The lesson generalizes: edge and distributed compute investments become fundable when sovereignty is the demand driver, not the garnish.

The caution: this is a capex-intensive, utilization-sensitive business competing against hyperscalers with structurally lower unit costs. Operators win where sovereignty, data residency and proximity are binding constraints — and lose everywhere else. The addressable market is the regulated slice of national demand, not "the AI market."

Edge inference is real but earlier than its promoters claim. Demand exists where latency or data gravity bind; margins are mid-range; and the horizon is two to five years before this becomes a broad product line. The use cases that pay today are those where physics or data gravity make centralized inference impossible: industrial vision, real-time media production, autonomous operations in ports and factories. I have seen these work commercially. But the buyer set is narrow, and each engagement still resembles a system integration project more than a product sale. This becomes a scalable product line when agentic AI workloads distribute themselves across infrastructure tiers — the architecture I have described elsewhere as the AI Grid. That shift is underway, not arrived.

Data and trust services are the sleeper. Deepfake detection on voice calls, branded and verified calling, identity assurance for AI agents, provenance services. These are small revenue lines today, but they are high-margin, they monetize immediately, they sit directly on operator trust assets that hyperscalers cannot replicate, and demand grows with every AI-enabled fraud headline. For a B2B operator, this category has the best margin-to-capex ratio of the four.

Network APIs are the line whose trajectory has changed most in the past two years. The strategic logic has always been sound — AI agents will need to programmatically request network resources, quality on demand, location, verification — and the commercial signals are finally following: revenues are growing, aggregation initiatives have consolidated distribution, and enterprise visibility is rising with every agentic deployment that needs verified identity or guaranteed quality. It remains the earliest-stage of the four, and the AI agent wave — rather than developer evangelism — is what gives it genuine demand pull. I would invest now to be positioned, while sizing near-term revenue expectations with discipline; the inflection is likely in the second half of the decade.

The monetization ladder

Across all four lines, there is a ladder that determines margin and defensibility:

Sell capacity → sell platform → sell outcomes. Capacity here includes every consumption-metered unit: GPU hours, tokens, gigabits.

Selling raw capacity — GPU hours, token-metered inference, connectivity — is rung one: necessary, low-margin, commoditizing from day one. Tokens deserve a specific caution here: metering in tokens rather than GPU-hours changes the billing unit, not the business. An operator selling tokens against someone else's models and someone else's stack is still selling capacity, at prices that will be set by the most efficient infrastructure provider in the market. Selling a platform — inference-as-a-service with orchestration, security, compliance tooling — is rung two, where margins improve and switching costs appear. Selling outcomes — a fraud-detection rate, a production workflow, a compliant AI deployment for a hospital group — is rung three, where the economics finally resemble a services business worth building.

Operators historically stall at rung one. The reasons are organizational, not technological: product management that thinks in network elements rather than buyer problems, sales forces compensated on connectivity, and business cases that demand payback before the platform layer has time to mature. The operators that climb the ladder will be those that treat AI monetization as a product management and go-to-market transformation, not an infrastructure deployment.

What the buyer actually pays for

A final discipline. In every commercially successful case I have worked on, the enterprise buyer was not paying for "AI." They were paying for a constraint to be removed: data that could not leave the country, latency that broke the use case, a fraud pattern that was costing millions, a compliance requirement that blocked deployment. Price the constraint, not the technology. The moment an operator's AI proposition cannot name the constraint it removes, it is a science project.

Three questions before approving any operator AI business case

  1. Which of the three money flows is this — cost, defense, or new revenue? If the answer mixes them, send it back.
  2. What binding constraint does the buyer pay to remove, and why is an operator structurally better placed to remove it than a hyperscaler or an integrator? Sovereignty, proximity and trust are acceptable answers. "We have a network" is not.
  3. Where does this sit on the capacity–platform–outcome ladder, and what is the credible path up? Rung-one economics with rung-three ambitions is where operator AI investments go to die.

The AI B2B opportunity for operators is real. It is also smaller, slower and more demanding of commercial discipline than the current narrative suggests. The winners will not be the operators with the most GPUs. They will be the ones that can tell the difference between a cost saving, a defended revenue and a new business — and fund each accordingly.

Wednesday, April 16, 2025

Is AI-RAN the future of telco?

 AI-RAN has emerged recently as an interesting evolution of telecoms networks. The Radio Access Network (RAN) has been undergoing a transformation over the last 10 years, from a vertical, proprietary highly concentrated market segment to a disaggregated, virtualized, cloud native ecosystem.

Product of the maturation of a number of technologies, including telco cloudification, RAN virtualization and open RAN and lately AI/ML, AI-RAN has been positioned as a means to disaggregate and open up further the RAN infrastructure.

This latest development has to be examined from an economic standpoint. RAN accounts roughly for 80% of a telco deployment (excluding licenses, real estate...) costs. 80% of these costs are roughly attributable to the radios themselves and their electronics. The market is dominated by few vendors and telecom operators are exposed to substantial supply chain risks and reduced purchasing power.

The AI RAN alliance was created in 2024 to accelerate its adoption. It is led by network operators (T-Mobile, Softbank, Boost Mobile, KT, LG Uplus, SK Telecom...) telecom and IT vendors (Nvidia, arm, Nokia, Ericsson Samsung, Microsoft, Amdocs, Mavenir, Pure Storage, Fujitsu, Dell, HPE, Kyocera, NEC, Qualcomm, Red Hat, Supermicro, Toyota...).

If you are familiar with this blog, you already know of the evolution from RAN to cloud RAN and Open RAN, and more recently the forays into RAN intelligence with the early implementations of near and non real time RAN Intelligence Controller (RIC). 

AI-RAN goes one step further in proposing that the specialized electronics and software traditionally embedded in RAN radios be deployed on high compute, GPU based commercial off the shelf servers and that these GPUs manage the complex RAN computation (beamforming management, spectrum and power optimization, waveform management...) and double as a general high compute environment for AI/ML applications that would benefit from deployment in the RAN (video surveillance, scene, object, biometrics recognition, augmented / virtual reality, real time digital twins...). It is very similar to the edge computing early market space.

The potential success of AI-RAN relies on a number of techno / economic assumptions:

For Operators:

  • It is desirable to be able to deploy RAN management, analytics, optimization, prediction, automation algorithms in a multivendor environment that will provide deterministic, programmable results.
  • Network operators will be able and willing to actively configure, manage and tune RAN parameters.
  • Deployment of AI-RAN infrastructure will be profitable (combination of compute costs being offloaded by cost reduction by optimization and new services opportunities).
  • AI-RAN power consumption, density, capacity, performance will exceed traditional architectures in time.
  • Network Operator will be able to accurately predict demand and deploy infrastructure in time and in the right locations to capture it.
  • Network Operators will be able to budget the CAPEX / OPEX associated with this investment before revenue materialization.
  • An ecosystem of vendors will develop that will reduce supply chain risks

For vendors:

  • RAN vendors will open their infrastructure and permit third parties to deploy AI applications.
  • RAN vendors will let operators and third parties program the RAN infrastructure.
  • There is sufficient market traction to productize AI-RAN.
  • The rate of development of AI and GPU technologies will outpace traditional architecture.
  • The cost of roadmap disruption and increased competition will be outweighed by the new revenues or is the cost to survive.
  • AI-RAN represents an opportunity for new vendors to emerge and focus on very specific aspects of the market demand without having to develop full stack solutions.

For customers:

  • There will be a market and demand for AI as a Service whereas enterprises and verticals will want to use a telco infrastructure that will provide unique computing and connectivity benefits over on-premise or public cloud solutions.
  • There are AI/ML services that (will) necessitate high performance computing environments, with guaranteed, programmable connectivity with a cost profile that is better mutualized through a multi tenant environment
  • Telcom operators are the best positioned to understand and satisfy the needs of this market
  • Security, privacy, residency, performance, reliability will be at least equivalent to on premise or cloud with a cost / performance benefit. 
As the market develops, new assumptions are added every day. The AI-RAN alliance has defined three general groups to create the framework to validate them: 
  1. AI for RAN: AI to improve RAN performance. This group focuses on how to program and optimize the RAN with AI. The expectations is that this work will drastically reduce the cost of RAN, while allowing sophisticated spectrum, radio waves and traffic manipulations for specific use cases.
  2. AI and RAN: Architecture to run AI and RAN on the same infrastructure. This group must find the multitenant architecture allowing the system to develop into a platform able to host a variety of AI workloads concurrently with the RAN. 
  3. AI on RAN: AI applications to run on RAN infrastructure. This is the most ambitious and speculative group, defining the requirements on the RAN to support the AI workloads that will be defined
As for Telco Edge Computing, and RAN intelligence, while the technological challenges appear formidable, the commercial and strategic implications are likely to dictate whether AI RAN will succeed. Telecom operators are pushing for its implementation, to increase control over spending, and user experience of the RAN, while possibly developing new revenue with the diffusion of AIaaS. Traditional RAN vendors see the nascent technology as further threat to their capacity to sell programmable networks as black boxes, configured, sold and operated by them. New vendors see the opportunity to step into the RAN market and carve out market share at the expense of legacy vendors.

Friday, August 16, 2024

Rant: Why do we need 6G anyway?


I have to confess that, even after 25 years in the business, I am still puzzled by the way we build mobile networks. If tomorrow we were to restart from scratch, with today's technology and knowledge of the market, we would certainly design and deploy them in a very different fashion.

Increasingly, mobile network operators (MNOs) have realized that the planning, deployment and management of the infrastructure is a fundamentally different business than the development and commercialization of the associated connectivity services. They follow different investment and amortization cycle and have very different economic and financial profiles. For this reason, investors value network infrastructure differently from digital services and many MNOs have decided to start separating their fibre, antennas, radio assets from their commercial operation.

This has resulted in a flurry of splits, spin off, divestiture and the growth of tower and infrastructure specialized companies. If we follow this pattern to its logical conclusion, looking at the failed economics of 5G and the promises of 6G, one has to wonder whether we are on the right path.

Governments keep treating spectrum as a finite, exclusive resource, whereas as private networks and unlicensed spectrum demand is increasing, it is clear that there is a cognitive dissonance in the economic model. If 5G's success was predicated on enterprise, industries and verticals connectivity and if these organizations have needs that cannot be satisfied by the public networks, why would MNOs spend so much money on a spectrum that is unlikely to bring additional revenue? The consumer market does not need another G until new services and devices emerge that mandate different connectivity profiles. Metaverse was a fallacy, autonomous vehicles, robots... are in their infancy and workaround the lack of connectivity adequacy by keeping their compute and sensors on device, rather than at the edge.

As the industry prepares for 6G and its associated future hype and non sensical use cases and fantastical services, one has to wonder how can we stop designing networks for use cases that never emerge as dominant, forcing redesigns and late adaptation. Our track record as an industry is not great there. If you remember, 2G was designed for voice services. Texting was the unexpected killer app. 3G was designed for Push to talk over Cellular, believe it or not (remember SIP and IMS...) and picture messaging early browsing were successful. 4G was designed for Voice over LTE (VoLTE) and video / social media were the key services. 5G was supposed to be designed for enterprise and industry connectivity but failed to deliver so far (late implementation of slicing and 5G Stand Alone). So... what do we do now?

First, the economic model has to change. Rationally, it is not economically efficient for 4 or 5 MNOs to buy spectrum and deploy their separate networks to cover the same population. We are seeing more and more network sharing agreements, but we must go further. In many countries, it makes more sense to have a single neutral infrastructure operator, including the cell sites, radio, the fiber backhaul even edge data centers / central offices all the way but not including the core. This neutral host can have an economic model based on wholesale and the MNOs can focus on selling connectivity products.

Of course, this would probably suppose some level of governmental and regulatory overhaul to facilitate this model. Obviously, one of the problems here is that many MNOs would have to transfer assets and more importantly personnel to that neutral host, which would undoubtedly see much redundancy from 3 or 4 teams to one. Most economically advanced countries have unions protecting these jobs, so this transition is probably impossible unless a concerted effort to cap hires / not renew retirement departures / retrain people is effected over many years...

The other part of the equation is the connectivity and digital services themselves. Let's face it, connectivity differentiation has mostly been a pricing and bundling exercise to date. MNOs have not been overly successful with the creation and sale of digital services, the emergence of social media, video streaming services having occupied most of the consumer's interest. On the enterprise's side a large part of the revenue is related to the exploitation of the last mile connectivity, with the sale of secure private connections on public networks in the form of MPLS first then SD-WAN to SASE and cloud interconnection as the main services. Gen AI promises to be the new shining beacon of advanced services, but in truth, there is very little there in the short term in terms of differentiation for MNOs. 

There is nothing wrong with being a very good, cost effective, performant utility connectivity provider. But most markets can probably accommodate only one or two of these. Other MNOs, if they want to survive, must create true value in the form of innovative connectivity services. This supposes not only a change of mindset but also skill set. I think MNOs need to look beyond the next technology, the next G and evolve towards a more innovative model. I have worked on many of these, from the framework to the implementation and systematic creation of sustainable competitive advantage. It is quite different work from standards and technology evolution approach favored by MNOs but necessary for these seeking to escape the utility model.

In conclusion, 6G or technological improvements in speed, capacity, coverage, latency... are unlikely to solve the systemic economical and differentiation problem for MNOs unless more effort is put on service innovation and radical infrastructure sharing.

Thursday, August 8, 2024

The journey to automated and autonomous networks

 

The TM Forum has been instrumental in defining the journey towards automation and autonomous telco networks. 

As telco revenues from consumers continue to decline and the 5G promise to create connectivity products that enterprises, governments and large organizations will be able to discover, program and consume remains elusive, telecom operators are under tremendous pressure to maintain profitability.

The network evolution started with Software Defined Networks, Network Functions Virtualization and more recently Cloud Native evolution aims to deliver network programmability for the creation of innovative on-demand connectivity services. Many of these services require deterministic connectivity parameters in terms of availability, bandwidth, latency, which necessitate end to end cloud native fabric and separation of control and data plane. A centralized control of the cloud native functions allow to abstract resource and allocate them on demand as topology and demand evolve.

A benefit of a cloud native network is that, as software becomes more open and standardized in a multi vendor environment, many tasks that were either manual or relied on proprietary interfaces can now be automated at scale. As layers of software expose interfaces and APIs that can be discovered and managed by sophisticated orchestration systems, the network can evolve from manual, to assisted, to automated, to autonomous functions.


TM Forum defines 5 evolution stages from full manual operation to full autonomous networks.

  • Condition 0 - Manual operation and maintenance: The system delivers assisted monitoring capabilities, but all dynamic tasks must be 0 executed manually
  • Step 1 - Assisted operations and maintenance: The system executes a specific, repetitive subtask based on pre-configuration, which can be recorded online and traced, in order to increase execution efficiency.
  • Step 2: - Partial autonomous network: The system enables closed-loop operations and maintenance for specific units under certain external environments via statically configured rules.
  • Step 3 - Conditional autonomous network: The system senses real-time environmental changes and in certain network domains will optimize and adjust itself to the external environment to enable, closed-loop management via dynamically programmable policies.
  • Step 4 - Highly autonomous network: In a more complicated cross-domain environment, the system enables decision-making based on predictive analysis or active closed-loop management of service-driven and customer experience-driven networks via AI modeling and continuous learning.
  • Step 5 - Fully autonomous network: The system has closed-loop automation capabilities across multiple services, multiple domains (including partners’ domains) and the entire lifecycle via cognitive self-adaptation.
After describing the framework and conditions for the first 3 steps, the TM Forum has recently published a white paper describing the Level 4 industry blueprints.

The stated goals of level 4 are to enable the creation and roll out of new services within 1 week with deterministic SLAs and the delivery of Network as a service. Furthermore, this level should allow fewer personnel to manage the network (1000's of person-year) while reducing energy consumption and improving service availability.

These are certainly very ambitious objectives. The paper goes on to describe "high value scenarios" to guide level 4 development. This is where we start to see cognitive dissonance creeping in between the stated objectives and the methodology.  After all, much of what is described here exists today in cloud and enterprise environments and I wonder whether Telco is once again reinventing the wheel in trying to adapt / modify existing concepts and technologies that are already successful in other environments.

First, the creation of deterministic connectivity is not (only) the product of automation. Telco networks, in particular mobile networks are composed of a daisy chain of network elements that see customer traffic, signaling, data repository, look up, authentication, authorization, accounting, policy management functions being coordinated. On the mobile front, the signal effectiveness varies over time, as weather, power, demand, interferences, devices... impact the effective transmission. Furthermore, the load on the base station, the backhaul, the core network and the  internet peering point also vary over time and have an impact on its overall capacity. As you understand, creating a connectivity product with deterministic speed, latency capacity to enact Network as a Service requires a systemic approach. In a multi vendor environment, the RAN, the transport, the core must be virtualized, relying on solid fiber connectivity as much as possible to enable the capacity and speed. The low latency requires multiple computing points, all the way to the edge or on premise. The deterministic performance requires not only virtualization and orchestration of the RAN, but also the PON fiber and end to end slicing support and orchestration. This is something that I led at Telefonica with an open compute edge computing platform, a virtualized (XGS) PON on a ONF ONOS VOLTHA architecture with an open virtualized RAN. This was not automated yet, as most of these elements were advanced prototype at that stage, but the automation is the "easy" part once you have assembled the elements and operated them manually for enough time. The point here is that deterministic network performances is attainable but still a far objective for most operators and it is a necessary condition to enact NaaS, before even automation and autonomous networks.

Second, the high value scenarios described in the paper are all network-related. Ranging from network troubleshooting, to optimization and service assurance, these are all worthy objectives, but still do not feel "high value" in terms of creation of new services. While it is natural that automation first focuses on cost reduction for roll out, operation, maintenance, healing of network, one would have expected more ambitious "new services" description.

All in all, the vision is ambitious, but there is still much work to do in fleshing out the details and linking the promised benefits to concrete services beyond network optimization.

Thursday, June 20, 2024

Telco grade or cloud grade ? II

I have oftentimes criticized network operators’ naivety when it comes to their capacity to convince members of the ecosystem to adopt their telco idiosyncrasies.

Tuesday, November 7, 2023

What's behind the operators' push for network APIs?

 


As I saw the latest announcements from GSMA, Telefonica and Deutsche Telekom, as well as the asset impairment from Ericsson on Vonage's acquisition, I was reminded of the call I was making three years ago for the creation of operators platforms.

One one hand, 21 large operators (namely, America Movil, AT&T, Axiata, Bharti Airtel, China Mobile, Deutsche Telekom, e& Group, KDDI, KT, Liberty Global, MTN, Orange, Singtel, Swisscom, STC, Telefónica, Telenor, Telstra, Telecom Italia (TIM), Verizon and Vodafone) within the GSMA launch an initiative to open their networks to developers with the launch of 8 "universal" APIs (SIM Swap, Quality on Demand, Device Status, Number Verification, Simple Edge Discovery, One Time Password SMS, Carrier Billing – Check Out and Device Location). 

Additionally, Deutsche Telekom was first to pull the trigger on the launch of their own gateway "MagentaBusiness API" based on Ericsson's depreciated asset. The 3 APIs launched are Quality-on-demand, Device Status – Roaming and Device Location, with more to come.

Telefonica, on their side launched shortly after DT their own Open Gateway offering with 9 APIs (Carrier Billing, Know your customer, Number verification, SIM Swap, QOD, Device status, Device location, QOD wifi and blockchain public address).

On the other hand, Ericsson wrote off 50% of the Vonage acquisition, while "creating a new market for exposing 5G capabilities through network APIs".

Dissonance much? why are operators launching network APIs in fanfare and one of the earliest, largest vendor in the field reporting asset depreciation while claiming a large market opportunity?

The move for telcos to exposing network APIs is not new and has had a few unsuccessful aborted tries (GSMA OneAPI in 2013, DT's MobiledgeX launch in 2019). The premises have varied over time, but the central tenet remains the same. Although operators have great experience in rolling out and operating networks, they essentially have been providing the same connectivity services to all consumers, enterprises and governmental organization without much variation. The growth in cloud networks is underpinned by new generations of digital services, ranging from social media, video streaming for consumers and cloud storage, computing, CPaaS and IT functions cloud migration for enterprises. Telcos have been mostly observers in this transition, with some timid tries to participate, but by and large, they have been quite unsuccessful in creating and rolling out innovative digital services. As Edge computing and Open RAN RIC become possibly the first applications forcing telcos to look at possible hyperscaler tie-ins with cloud providers, it raises several strategic questions.

Telcos have been using cloud fabric and porting their vertical, proprietary systems to cloud native environment for their own benefit. As this transition progresses, there is a realization that private networks growth are a reflection of enterprises' desire to create and manage their connectivity products themselves. While operators have been architecting and planning their networks for network slicing, hoping to sell managed connectivity services to enterprises, the latter have been effectively managing their connectivity, in the cloud and in private networks themselves without the telcos' assistance. This realization leads to an important decision: If enterprises want to manage their connectivity themselves and expand that control to 5G / Cellular, should Telcos let them and if yes, by what means?

The answer is in network APIs. Without giving third party access to the network itself, the best solution is to offer a set of controlled, limited, tools that allow to discover, reserve and consume network resources while the operator retains the overall control of the network itself. There are a few conditions for this to work. 

The first, is essentially the necessity for universal access. Enterprises and developers have gone though the learning curve of using AWS, Google cloud and Azure tools, APIs and semantic. They can conceivably see value in learning a new set with these Telco APIs, but wont likely go through the effort if each Telco has a different set in different country.

The second, and historically the hardest for telcos is to create and manage an ecosystem and developer community. They have tried many times and in different settings, but in many cases have failed, only enlisting friendly developers, in the form of their suppliers and would be suppliers, dedicating efforts to further their commercial opportunities. The jury is still out as to whether this latest foray will be successful in attracting independent developers.

The third, and possibly the most risky part in this equation, is which APIs would prove useful and whether the actual premise that enterprises and developers will want to use them is untested. Operators are betting that they can essentially create a telco cloud experience for developers more than 15 years after AWS launched, with less tools, less capacity to innovate, less cloud native skills and a pretty bad record in nurturing developers and enterprises.

Ericsson's impairment of Vonage probably acknowledges that the central premise that Telco APIs are desirable is unproven, that if it succeeds, operators will want to retain control and that there is less value in the platform than in the APIs themselves (the GSMA launch on an open source platform essentially directly depreciates the Vonage acquisition).

Another path exist, which provides less control (and commercial upside) for Telcos, where they would  host third party cloud functions in their networks, even allowing third party cloud infrastructure (such as Amazon Outpost for instance) to be collocated in their data centers. This option comes with the benefit of an existing ecosystem, toolset, services and clients, just extending the cloud to the telco network. The major drawback is that the telco accepts their role as utility provider of connectivity with little participation in the service value creation.

Both scenarios are being played out right now and both paths represent much uncertainty and risks for operators that do not want to recognize the strategic implications of their capabilities.


Wednesday, October 18, 2023

Generative AI and Intellectual Property

Since the launch of ChatGPT, Generative Artificial Intelligence and Large Language Models have gained an extraordinary popularity and agency in a very short amount of time. As we are all playing around with the most approachable use cases to generate texts, images and videos, governments, global organizations and companies are busy developing the technology; and racing to harness the early mover's advantage this disruption will bring to all areas of our society.

I am not a specialist in the field and my musings might be erroneous here, but it feels that the term  Gen AI might be a little misguiding, since a lot of the technology relies on vast datasets that are used to assemble composite final products. Essentially, the creation aspect is more an assembly than a pure creation. One could object that every music sheet is just an assembly of notes and that creation is still there, even as the author is influenced by their taste and exposure to other authors... Fair enough, but in the case of document / text creation, it feels that the use of public information to synthetize a document is not necessarily novel.

In any case, I am an information worker, most times a labourer, sometimes an artisan but in any case I live from my intellectual property. I chose to make some of that intellectual property available license free here on this blog, while a larger part is sold in the form of reports, workshops, consulting work, etc... This work might or not be license-free but it is in always copyrighted, meaning that I hold the rights to the content and allow its distribution under specific covenants.

It strikes me that, as I see crawlers go through my blog and indexing the content I make publicly available, it serves two purposes at odds with each other. The first, allows my content to be discovered and to reach a larger audience, which benefits me in terms of notoriety and increased business. The second, more insidious not only indexes but mines my content to aggregate in LLMs so that it can be regurgitated and assembled by an AI. It could be extraordinarily difficult to apportion an AI's rendition of an aggregated document to its source, but it feels unfair that copyrighted content is not attributed.

I have playing with the idea of using LLM for creating content. Anyone can do that with prompts and some license-free software, but I am fascinated with the idea of an AI assistant that would be able to write like me, using my semantics and quirks and that I could train through reinforcement learning from human feedback. Again, this poses some issues. To be effective, this AI would have to have access to my dataset, the collection of intellectual property I have created over the years. This content is protected and is my livelihood, so I cannot part with it with a third party without strict conditions. That rules out free software that can reuse whatever content you give it to ingest.

With licensed software, I am still not sure the right mechanisms are in place for copyright and content protection and control, so that I can ensure that the content I feed to the LLM remains protected and accessible only to me, while the LLM can ingest other content from license free public domain to enrich the dataset.

Are other information workers worried that LLM/AI reuses their content without attribution? Is it time to have a conversation about Gen AI, digital rights management and copyright?

***This blog post was created organically without assistance from Gen AI, except from the picture created from Canva.com 

Tuesday, October 3, 2023

Should regulators forfeit spectrum auctions if they cant resolve Net Neutrality / Fair Share?

I have been
writing about Net Neutrality and Fair Share broadband usage for nearly 10 years. Both sides of the argument have merit and it is difficult to find a balanced view represented in the media these days. Absolutists would lead you to believe that internet usage should be unregulated with everyone able to stream, download, post anything anywhere, without respect for intellectual property or fair usage; while on the other side of the fence, service provider dogmatists would like to control, apportion, prioritize and charge based on their interests.

Of course, the reality is a little more nuanced. A better understanding of the nature and evolution of traffic, as well as the cost structure of networks help to appreciate the respective parties' stance and offer a better view on what could be done to reduce the chasm.

  1. From a costs structure's perspective first, our networks grow and accommodate demand differently whether we are looking at fixed line / cable / fibre broadband or mobile. 
    1. In the first case, capacity growth is function of technology and civil works. 
      1. On the technology front, the evolution to dial up / PSTN  to copper and fiber increases dramatically to network's capacity and has followed ~20 years cycles. The investments are enormous and require the deployment, management of central offices and their evolution to edge compute date centers. These investments happen in waves within a relatively short time frame (~5 years). Once operated, the return on investment is function of the number of users and the utilisation rate of the asset, which in this case means filling the network with traffic.
      2. On the civil works front, throughout the technology evolution, a continuous work is ongoing to lay transport fiber along new housing developments, while replacing antiquated and aging copper or cable connectivity. This is a continuous burn and its run rate is function of the operator's financial capacity.
    2. In mobile networks, you can find similar categories but with a much different balance and impact on ROI.
      1. From a technology standpoint, the evolution from 1G to 5G has taken roughly 10 years per cycle. A large part of the investment for each generation is a spectrum license leased from the regulating / government. In addition to this, most network elements, from the access to the core and OSS /BSS need to be changed. The transport part relies in large part on the fixed network above. Until 5G, most of these elements were constituted of proprietary servers and software, which meant a generational change induced a complete forklift upgrade of the infrastructure. With 5G, the separation of software and hardware, the extensive use of COTS hardware and the implementation of cloud based separation of traffic and control plane, should mean that the next generational upgrade will be les expensive with only software and part of the hardware necessitating complete refresh.
      2. The civil work for mobile network is comparable to the fixed network for new coverage, but follows the same cycles as the technology timeframe with respect to upgrades and changes necessary to the radio access. Unlike the fixed network, though, there is an obligation of backwards compatibility, with many networks still running 2G, 3G, 4G while deploying 5G. The real estate being essentially antennas and cell sites, this becomes a very competitive environment with limited capacity for growth in space, pushing service providers to share assets (antennas, spectrum, radios...) and to deploy, whenever possible, multi technology radios.
The conclusion here is that you have fixed networks with long investment cycles and ROI, low margin, relying on number of connections and traffic growth. The mobile networks has shorter investment cycles, bursty margin growth and reduction with new generations.

What does this have to do with Net Neutrality / Fair Share? I am coming to it, but first we need to examine the evolution of traffic and prices to understand where the issue resides.

Now, in the past, we had to pay for every single minute, text, kb received or sent. Network operators were making money of traffic growth and were pushing users and content providers to fill their networks. Video somewhat changed that. A user watching a 30 seconds video doesn't really care / perceive if the video is at 720, 1080 or 4K, 30 or 60 fps. It is essentially the same experience. That same video, though can have a size variation of 20x depending on its resolution. To compound that issue, operators have foolishly transitioned to all you can eat data plans with 4G to acquire new consumers, a self inflicted wound that has essentially killed their 5G business case.

I have written at length about the erroneous assumptions that are underlying some of the discourses of net neutrality advocates. 

In order to understand net neutrality and traffic management, one has to understand the different perspectives involved.
  • Network operators compete against each other on price, coverage and more importantly network quality. In many cases, they have identified that improving or maintaining quality of Experience is the single most important success factor for acquiring and retaining customers. We have seen it time and again with voice services (call drops, voice quality…), messaging (texting capacity, reliability…) and data services (video start, stalls, page loading time…). These KPI are the heart of the operator’s business. As a result, operators tend to either try to improve or control user experience by deploying an array of traffic management functions, etc...
  • Content providers assume that highest quality of content (8K UHD for video for instance) equals maximum experience for subscriber and therefore try and capture as much network resource as possible to deliver it. Browser / apps / phone manufacturers also assume that more speed equals better user experience, therefore try to commandeer as much capacity as possible. 
The flaw here is the assumption that the optimum is the product of many maxima self-regulated by an equal and fair apportioning of resources. This shows a complete ignorance of how networks are designed, how they operate and how traffic flows through these networks.

This behavior leads to a network where resources can be in contention and all end-points vie for priority and maximum resource allocation. From this perspective one can understand that there is no such thing as "net neutrality" at least not in wireless networks. 

When network resources are over-subscribed, decisions are taken as to who gets more capacity, priority, speed... The question becomes who should be in position to make these decisions. Right now, the laissez-faire approach to net neutrality means that the network is not managed, it is subjected to traffic. When in contention, resources are managing traffic based on obscure rules in load balancers, routers, base stations, traffic management engines... This approach is the result of lazy, surface thinking. Net neutrality should be the opposite of non-intervention. Its rules should be applied equally to networks, devices / apps/browsers and content providers if what we want to enable is fair and equal access to resources.

As we are contemplating 6G, and hints of metaverse, augmented / mixed reality and hyper connectivity, the cost structure of network infrastructure hasn't yet been sufficiently decoupled from traffic growth and as we have seen, video is elastic and XR will be a heavy burden on the networks. Network operators have essentially failed so far to offer attractive digital services that would monetize their network investments. Video and digital services providers are already paying for their on premise and cloud infrastructure as well as transport, there is little chance they would finance telco operators for capacity growth.

Where does this leave us? It might be time for regulators / governments to either take an active and balanced role in Net Neutrality and Fair share to ensure that both side can find a sustainable business model or to forfeit spectrum auctions for next generations.